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Abstract 
Following Demetis & Lee (2016) who showed how systems theorizing can be conducted on the 
basis of a few systems principles, in this conceptual paper, we apply these principles to theorize 
about the systemic character of technology and investigate the role reversal in the relationship 
between humans and technology. By applying systems-theoretical requirements outlined by 
Demetis & Lee, we examine conditions for the systemic character of technology and, based on our 
theoretical discussion, we argue that humans can now be considered artifacts shaped and used by 
the (system of) technology rather than vice versa. We argue that the role reversal has considerable 
implications for the field of information systems that has thus far focused only on the use of the IT 
artifact by humans. We illustrate these ideas with empirical material from a well-known case from 
the financial markets: the collapse (“Flash Crash”) of the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  
Keywords: IT artifact, Human Artifact, Systems Theory, Systemic Technology. 
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1 Introduction 
The field of information systems (IS) rests largely on 
examining the contextual use of technology within 
social (sub)systems and organizations. In such a 
context, the relationship between the social and the 
technical has always been of special interest to IS 
researchers. Ultimately, this interest is applied to the 
interactions between humans and information 
technology, and at the center of attention, one can 
often find the concept of the IT artifact. From 
considering the IT artifact as an ensemble of 
hardware and software (March & Smith, 1995) to 
bundles of material and cultural properties that are 
recognizable and emerge from ongoing 
socioeconomic practices (Orlikowski & Iacono, 
2001), or even to sociotechnical assemblages (Silver 
& Markus, 2013), one thing is clear: the concept of 
the IT artifact has mutated substantially over the years 
in how it has been depicted by the IS community. In 
fact, the ontological dimensions upon which the “IT 
artifact” has come to be considered have shifted so 
much that Steven Alter’s suggestion was to “retire” 
that concept altogether from the lexicon of IS 
scholarly debate, as it had outlived its usefulness 
(Alter, 2015). While this is not an essay about the 
concept of the IT artifact per se, we do make the 
argument that the nebulous character of that concept 
is due to a much larger (though subtle) phenomenon 
at play: the transition of technology from artifact to 
system. In fact, the contextual richness that has been 
added to the concept of the “IT artifact” after its first 
use by March and Smith (1995), can be reinterpreted 
as a recognition of such a transition. Inspired by the 
posthumanist tradition that reflects on the boundaries 
between humans and technology, we take a different 
approach. We develop a systems theoretical 
description of the transition from artifact to 
system and argue that people are becoming agents 
of (the system of) technology.  





Over time, technology has penetrated society to such 
a degree that even basic functions now seem almost 
inconceivable without technology. Indeed, this level 
of societal dependence on technology has become so 
deep that—in a large number of fields—there are now 
no manual fallback plans in cases of technological 
failure. By and large, even when technology fails, we 
tend to rely on more technology for rectifying the 
problems of technological use. Also, the rising trend 
of technologized decision-making that has taken 
certain fields by storm is even more alarming. In the 
foreign exchange markets, for example, 85 percent of 
all trading is conducted by algorithms alone, i.e., 
without any human intervention; this led the scholars 
investigating the phenomenon to call it the “Rise of 
the Machines” (Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, & 
Vega, 2009). In the UK, the “ultra-high-speed version 
of algorithmic trading, high frequency trading, is 
estimated to account for over 77% of transactions in 
the UK market” (Sornette & Becke, 2011, p. 5).  
A skeptic of our position, who might seek to argue 
against the trend of technologized decision-making, 
might pose this question: Is it not the case that the 
designers of algorithms are humans? And if so, then 
couldn’t someone consider the role of algorithms 
(and of technology at large) as an extended 
application of human decisions?  
Our challenge is to convince the reader of the 
contrary. For this purpose, we address this issue 
through a few intertwined questions: How does 
technology subvert and subdue human decisions? 
What conditions can be identified (with the help of 
systems theorizing) for this new role that technology 
has assumed, and how does this constitute the 
emergence of a system of technology? Even more 
crucially, how is it that humans assume the role of 
“artifacts” being shaped and used by technology in 
this—seemingly counterintuitive—role reversal? For 
the latter condition, we reserve the term “artificial 
humans” or “human artifacts”—in contrast to 
Simon’s (1996) “artificial things” (i.e., artifacts).  
As we will see through our example of the Flash 
Crash regarding the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
the role of technology leads us to consider a 
seemingly radical idea at first. This idea, we argue, is 
an accurate reflection of how technology shapes 
social systems and subjects humans to forces that cast 
them “out to the environment” (in a systems 
theoretical sense, whereby the environment is what 
lies outside the boundary of a system), outside of 
what has become technologized decision-making; 
instead of the IT artifact being shaped and used by 
humans, humans can actually be considered as 
“artifacts” being shaped and used by machines. By 
casting humans out to the environment, technology 
does not make humans redundant altogether. In fact, 
the human artifact, as we incorporate it into our 
theorizing, is a role that humans assimilate 
themselves into. So an environment surrounding a 
system of technology is not, from a systems 
theoretical perspective, an ontological isolation 
chamber. A boundary between a system and its 
environment creates a distinction that is helpful 
analytically, but relations across the boundary are not 
eliminated. As Luhmann indicates:  
The concept of the environment should not 
be misunderstood as a kind of residual 
category. Instead, relationship to the 
environment is constitutive in system 
formation. It does not have merely 
“accidental” significance, in comparison 
with the “essence” of the system. Nor is 
the environment significant only for 
“preserving” the system, for supplying 
energy and information . . .the environment 
is, rather, a presupposition for the system’s 
identity, because identity is possible only 
by difference. . . . Everything that happens 
belongs to a system (or to many systems) 
and always at the same time to the 
environment of other systems. (Luhmann, 
1995, pp. 176–177) 
Thus, even with technology dominating decision-
making in certain fields (e.g., finance), 
human/technology relations continue to occur but we 
argue that while human agency is reduced, the 
reconfiguration of the relations between humans and 
technology is guided largely by the emergence of a 
system of technology. This is qualitatively different 
from a quest to clarify the concept of the IT artifact 
per se and inspired by a theoretical tradition (Bateson, 
1972) that accepts “that the point from which all 
further investigations in systems theory must begin is 
therefore not identity but difference” (Luhmann, 
1995, p. 177). In this view, and in domains where 
human agency is becoming subordinate to automated 
executions, it is humans that must react to 
technological stimuli rather than technology that must 
react to human stimuli. Furthermore, the 
technological stimuli are emergent and not 
predesigned (or preprogrammed) in any way. This 
also assumes that while the controllability of 
technology can be achieved at a microscale (where 
one could assert that the link between designers and 
(control of) artifacts is strict), at a macroscale, 
technology exhibits emergent nonlinear phenomena 
that render controllability infeasible. Ultimately, this 
transition from controllability at the microlevel (the 
domain of computer science) to emergent and 
systemic nonlinearity at the macrolevel showcases the 
pressing need for the field of IS to explore the much 
larger social, economic, cultural, and organizational 
shifts that reduce human agency and result in what we 
call a role reversal between humans and technology. 




Stripped of causality and linearity at the macrolevel, 
as well as devoid of controllability, technology 
emerges as a nondeterministic system of interference 
that shapes human behavior. In turn, humans react to 
the nondeterministic emergent stimuli that a system 
of technology spawns. Thus, our description demands 
a systemic role for technology, with humans increasingly 
finding themselves in the environment of that system with 
which they remain coupled—indeed, in “loose couplings” 
that often reduce humans to artifacts themselves.  
The next section of this paper presents some related 
work and developments in the concept of the artifact 
that aim at exploring the significance of the broader 
trajectory of the IT artifact and the emergence of a 
system of technology. The third section of the paper 
discusses a few examples in brief while the fourth 
section provides a review of a selection of the general 
requirements proposed by Demetis & Lee (2016) for 
systems theorizing, for the purpose of theorizing 
about technology itself as a system in the systems 
theoretical sense. The fourth section also serves to 
pose reflective questions about the deep interference 
of technology in society and highlight elements that 
ought to be considered for technology in this context. 
The fifth section presents the case of the Flash Crash 
in the Dow Jones Industrial Average index and 
reviews the key characteristics of that case by 
considering how technology shaped the minicrisis 
through automated execution strategies. In the sixth 
section of the essay, we engage in a brief discussion on 
the consequences of the basic systemic principles of 
technology. Finally, in the seventh section of the paper, 
we offer our thoughts on a research agenda for the future. 
2 Developments in the Concept of 
the “Artifact” 
In this section, we seek to review some basic 
principles around the concept of the artifact but also 
explore what the broader trajectory of IT artifact 
variants implies. While it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to delineate all the different variations of the 
concept of the IT artifact, we would like to clarify 
that we are more interested in what the existence of 
all these different variants signifies. As we will argue, 
the IS community has thus far taken the approach of 
piling one “IT artifact” concept on top of another 
while overlooking what these variations in concepts 
signify. But while the IS field has been, perhaps, 
preoccupied with “micromanaging” the description of 
the concept of the IT artifact, the field has failed to 
consider the possibility of humans assuming the role 
of artifacts that are “cast out to the environment” of a 
system of technology. For a reflection on the 
evolution of the concept of the IT artifact and an 
exposition of the “artificial human” (i.e., the human 
artifact) following our case study, we turn to a 
handful of cardinal points on the nature of the artifact. 
In their work going back to the origins of the concept 
of the artifact, Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville (2015) 
refer to Herbert Simon’s work and, more specifically, 
to the indicia that demarcate the distinction between 
the natural and the artificial. We regard these indicia 
to be foundational in our argument about whether the 
IT or the human can be considered as an artifact. 
According to Simon’s treatise (1996, p. 5), as quoted 
by Lee et al., these are portrayed as follows: 
1. Artificial things [“artifacts”] are synthesized 
(though not always or usually with full 
forethought) by human beings. 
2. Artificial things may imitate appearances in 
natural things while lacking, in one or many 
respects, the reality of the latter.  
3. Artificial things can be characterized in 
terms of functions, goals, adaptation. 
4. Artificial things are often discussed, 
particularly when they are being designed, in 
terms of imperatives as well as descriptives. 
We will return to Simon’s indicia when we later 
explicate our concept of the human artifact, in 
contrast to the IT artifact. 
In the context of a transition from the general 
“artifact” concept to the “IT artifact,” March and 
Smith (1995) take a design science approach 
informed by Simon’s work and view IT artifacts as 
“instantiated in specific products . . . intended to 
perform certain tasks” (p. 253); IT artifacts embody 
specific characteristics and can be broadly understood as 
consisting of hardware and software. In addition, Simon 
(1996) clearly conceives of the computer as an artifact:  
The computer is a member of an important 
family of artifacts called symbol systems, 
or more explicitly, physical symbol 
systems. . . symbol systems are almost the 
quintessential artifacts, for adaptivity to an 
environment is their whole raison d’être. 
They are goal-seeking information 
processing systems, usually enlisted in the 
service of the larger systems in which they 
are incorporated. (p. 21–22) 
Of course, despite the existence of some systemic 
characteristics in Simon’s work in the context of the 
quotation above (e.g., system/environment), it was 
generally understood that computers as artifacts 
adapted to a very particular type of “environment”—
one both created and guided by human decisions. 
Such artifacts are “human-created artifacts that have 
value insofar as they address this task” (March & 
Smith, 1995, p. 258). But as we shall argue in our 
discussion, and support through our case, this is 
gradually being reversed with IT artifacts developing 
into systems that largely create the environment to 
which they themselves react. In what can be 





recognized as a recursive process (Luhmann, 2002), 
IT artifacts subdue and confine human decisions and 
reduce their function in a way that—in turn—
supports the IT artifacts themselves. This recursive 
condition gives rise to the additional role of the 
human artifact: a human of reduced agency that is 
both shaped by and reacts to technological stimuli 
that are emergent and nondeterministic.  
March and Smith’s reflections in the context of 
design science were followed in a more general 
context by Orlikowski and Iacono (2001), who 
emphasized that there is a significant undertheorizing 
of the concept of the IT artifact and saw the latter as 
superficially represented in IS research. The impact of 
Orlikowski’s and Iacono’s work is evident—their 
article was followed by the publication of “360 
refereed articles” within a timeframe of almost 14 
years (Lee et al., 2015, p. 6); however, this “surge of 
interest in technological artifacts was further 
accelerated” (Lee et al., 2015, p. 6) also by Hevner, 
March, Park, and Ram (2004). The shift that occurred 
in the reconceptualization of the IT artifact created 
another vision that emphasized the packaging of 
material and cultural properties in some recognizable 
form of hardware and/or software (Orlikowski & 
Iacono, 2001, p. 121), thereby highlighting the 
contextual significance within which IT artifacts are 
embedded. While it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to revisit the multiplicity of different 
conceptualizations of the IT artifact, we must 
nevertheless stress the ontological significance of 
such a multiplicity. Whether one invokes what 
Orlikowski and Iacono name a tool, proxy, ensemble, 
computational or nominal view of technology, one is 
essentially ignoring the recursive nature of how the 
artifact affects itself; this level of how technology 
interferes with itself (a self-referential expression) is 
hard for humans to contemplate (and even accept), as 
it leads to the counterintuitive proposition that 
humans are now the artifacts being shaped, a position 
that implies humanity is unwittingly adapting or 
being adapted on the basis of unintended computer-
generated consequences. As we shall see, in some 
cases, future configurations of human behavior are 
even designed out of such unintended computer-based 
stimuli. This differs radically from other perspectives 
that conceptualize IT within a specific context and a 
structure embedded in that context (Benbasat & 
Zmud, 2003). While there is indeed a sociotechnical 
assemblage of IT artifacts (Silver & Markus, 2013) in 
what can be conceived of as a “sociotechnical 
artifact,” we posit that technology is overtaking not 
only human decisions and the context of their 
embeddedness, but also entire subsystems of society 
(such as, as we will later show, the financial system).  
The avalanche of IT artifact variants that have sprung 
from the work of Orlikowski and Iacono is—if 
considered as a unity and viewed from a metalevel—
enough of a reason to make one doubt their 
usefulness. In turn, this variety has been interpreted as 
confusion and has even led scholars like Steven Alter 
to “retire” the concept of the IT artifact altogether. 
While we would not argue that the concept must be 
made redundant altogether, we would agree with 
Alter’s insightful concerns and ask: what does the 
coexistence of so many models of IT artifacts tell us? 
How can we rethink the identity of the IT artifact 
through contingent differences? 
While Simon’s (1996, p. 3) assertion that “as our 
aims change, so too do our artifacts and vice versa” 
remains valid, the IS field has thus far ignored the 
“vice versa.” What is this vice versa expression 
exactly? As our artifacts change, our human aims 
change too. While we cannot attribute to Simon an 
inference on a role reversal as we see it with the 
concept of the human artifact, we would add that our 
behaviors, intentionalities, and designs, change 
accordingly; they find themselves under the influence 
of nondeterministic effects of complex technologies. 
Thus, what we have is an inversion of influence 
between the IT artifact and humans.  
One of the main reasons why the evolution of the IT 
artifact is hard to explore is because it is only one side 
to a contingent distinction (IT artifact/Human 
artifact); like any distinction, this distinction too is 
neither objective nor fixed but contingent upon an 
observer that decides how the distinction is to be 
explored. Any observer’s choice can then be 
subjected to second-order observations (Luhmann, 
1995); in simple terms this means that different 
observers are never looking at the same thing when 
observing. This is exponentially more challenging 
when we consider the ensemble of complex 
technologies that are supporting, as an example, the 
totality of the financial system. Can any one observer 
delineate how such an “artifact” even functions? To 
what degree has technology acquired a life of its own, 
so to speak? In such a context—and put simply—
there can never be resolution or crystallization of the 
concept of the “IT artifact” because it is only one part 
of a contingent dynamic and whatever slice scholars 
explore, the whole remains unobservable (Angell & 
Demetis, 2010; Luhmann, 2002): we are looking at a 
continuous creation/recreation of technological blind 
spots, and the way this affects society is far from 
clear. While the recognizable contextual richness that 
has been added to the IT artifact by Silver and 
Markus (2013) alerts us to the importance of the 
context within which artifacts are embedded, the 
continuous metamorphosis of the IT artifact only 
serves to illustrate how different scholars have been 
building theoretical and conceptual constructs upon 
moving sand. While this is frustrating for the IS field 
that has weaved the quest for a conceptually lucid IT 




artifact into the very existence of IS (and the 
resolution of its identity crisis), we argue that this 
quest is misplaced. We should embrace this 
condition, instead of considering it as an identity 
crisis. As Foerster (1971, p. 1) reminds us: “Hard 
sciences are successful because they deal with the soft 
problems; the soft sciences are struggling because 
they deal with the hard problems.” Ultimately, 
information systems, as a soft science, has taken the 
concept of the IT artifact as the field’s dependent 
variable, succumbing to the Popperian delusion of 
objectivity in relation to empirical domains: 
The empirical basis of objective science 
has thus nothing “absolute” about it. 
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. 
The bold structure of its theories rises, as it 
were, above a swamp. It is like a building 
erected on piles. The piles are driven down 
from above into the swamp, but not down 
into any natural or “given” base; and if 
we stop driving the piles deeper it is not 
because we have reached firm ground. We 
simply stop when we are satisfied that the 
piles are firm enough to carry the 
structure, at least for the time being 
(Popper, 2002, p. 94) 
Applying Popper’s ideas here to the concept of the IT 
artifact, we can say that we must deny any pretense to 
an ultimate objective foundation for such a concept. 
This applies also to the concept of the human artifact, 
discussed later on in a rudimentary form. In the 
transitions explored in the concept of the IT artifact, 
we (as an IS community) have merely been piling one 
concept on top of another, hoping that at some point 
we will hit Popper’s “solid bedrock.” Popper reminds 
us that even within the natural sciences, there is no 
solid bedrock. The reason that the process of 
accumulating artifact variants hasn’t stopped is 
because the IS community is not satisfied that the 
piles are firm enough to carry the structure, all the 
while losing sight of how the swamp has been 
moving. The disruptive uncertainties that emerge 
from networked interactions and complex 
computations, raise their heads above any intertwined 
dependencies of sociotechnical and/or sociomaterial 
assemblages. Thus, throughout this process, the IS 
field has been driving the piles of “IT artifacts” above 
a swamp of transitory technological changes. What 
we are asking, in the context of this metaphor, is 
“how is the swamp” moving (in the Popperian sense) 
and what does that mean? This, we believe, is a more 
pertinent question with more critical theoretical 
consequences. By embracing this condition, we may 
explore the possibility of shifting the focus from IT as 
the artifact that humans are designing and shaping for 
human purposes, to humans as the artifact that IT, or 
a system of technology, is designing and shaping for 
the purposes of the system of technology. We 
recognize this systemic nature of technology in the 
systems theoretical sense and the ensuing role reversal 
as a unique type of subordination of human decision-
making. We (as humans) now live in a society of 
technology, and in an increasing number of domains (such 
as finance), we assume the role of artifacts ourselves.  
3 Examples of Technologized 
Decision-Making 
Indeed, one can find a wealth of examples where 
technological autonomy has developed into a system 
that takes over important decisions—and humans find 
themselves outside, i.e., cast out to the environment, 
outside of these decisions. In such examples, human 
agency—acting on behalf of another, or providing a 
particular service—is being replaced by 
technologized agency. In categorizing the World 
Wide Web for instance, Google (to bring up one 
example) uses proprietary algorithmic robots (known 
as bots) to create a searchable database that then ranks 
users’ search results based on their search queries. 
The structuring of the bot-generated entries contains 
the logic of how something will be “made 
searchable,” though due to the complexity of the task, 
the interaction between bots and websites that are 
indexed must be unsupervised. But while the millions 
of preindexed search results give the illusion of 
choice, almost 90% of humans don’t get past the top 
ten (Jansen & Spink, 2003). The whole process feels 
like a “search on the Internet” but it is actually a 
restricted human search of a technological presearch 
of the Internet: the “search of a search.” Hence, this is 
a case of a human reacting to technological stimuli 
(i.e., an individual person reacting to the 
algorithmically generated search results intended to 
steer the person’s behavior) rather than a technology 
reacting to human stimuli (i.e, a neutral search 
algorithm providing objective results to best serve a 
human using the technology).  
Another well-known example comes from Amazon. 
The vast majority of prices are defined by algorithms 
in so far as Amazon vendors “use algorithmic pricing 
to ensure that they can automatically change their 
product prices based on a competitor” (Solon, 2011), 
with the result that vendors are being forced to 
engage in this practice for fear of losing out to the 
competition. Meanwhile, the algorithmic interactions 
between vendors carry the possibility of developing 
unpredictable consequences. Such algorithmic pricing 
on Amazon can be found in the example of the book 
entitled The Making of a Fly by evolutionary biologist 
Peter Lawrence. This book came to be priced at 
$23,698,655.93 (plus $3.99 shipping) as two sellers 
were using algorithms to adjust the price of the book 
in response to one another. It took 10 days for 
humans to notice and intervene to bring back the 





prices to normal levels; ironically, “normal levels” 
merely indicated a temporary human decision that 
would allow the continuation of algorithmic pricing.  
Similar examples of human decisions and human 
reactions finding themselves outside the boundary of 
technologized decision-making, can also be seen in 
other domains. In law for instance, legal analysts are 
beginning to be replaced in complex cases by 
software that analyzes thousands of legal 
documents—proprietary e-discovery algorithms of 
software companies prestructure the 
defense/prosecution of a case by effectively 
preselecting an extremely limited subset of 
documents that will then be looked at and presented 
in court by humans (Markoff, 2011). The way that 
technology interferes with decisions is perhaps even 
starker in cases where personal liberties are at stake. 
For instance, in the United States, a large number of 
states use a variety of automated risk-assessment 
tools to decide (algorithmically) whether a prisoner 
should get parole (Kehl, Guo, & Kessler, 2017). The 
way this happens is both subtle and invisible (to an 
observer, i.e., a human judge who has no access to 
how the algorithm made the first decision attributing 
a risk score to a prisoner). This service is offered by a 
private, outsourced software company; essentially, 
algorithms scan prisoners’ biographies to generate 
patterns that predict future criminal behavior (Walker, 
2013). Thus, the algorithmic dependency upon which 
parole boards and judges rely is yet another obvious 
extraneous factor in judicial decisions (Danzigera & 
Avnaim-Pessoa, 2011). To make matters worse, an 
algorithmic bias against black defendants has been 
discovered when analyzing the same types of 
offenses; judges often rely on these risk assessments 
without access to all the data that goes into the 
algorithmic calculations. Risk scores for white 
defendants, in this case, were skewed toward lower-
risk categories, but those for black defendants were 
almost static across different risk-score bands. For 
example, for the exact same background of arrests on 
two drug possession charges, Dylan Fugett (white, 
male) was given a low algorithmic-risk score of (3 
out of 10), while Bernard Parker (African American, 
male) was given the highest possible algorithmic-risk 
score of 10 out of 10. After the release of both (over 
time), Fugett has been arrested three times on drug 
charges, while Parker has not reoffended (Angwin, 
Mattu, & Kirchner, 2016). In this case example, 
technology largely preconstructed the legal decision 
by designating a risk of reoffending and by risk-
scoring prisoners. Human decision-making was thus 
shaped, influenced, preconstructed, and to some 
degree governed by an algorithmic backdrop against 
which human decisions were referred. Of course, 
somebody made design choices along the way, albeit 
bounded by the technology itself, regulation, and 
other factors. However, the visibility of the 
consequences of these choices will vary from one 
information system to another. In information 
systems that exhibit high degrees of complexity and 
interactions (such as the main example that we’re 
exploring in this paper with algorithmic trading), the 
concept of the “IT artifact” mutates into that of a 
system that envelops its own consequences (on the 
basis of which new design choices are made).  
By and large, it would be fair to say that in such 
cases, humans become the tool through which 
computerized decisions are voiced. In the case of 
autonomous driving, Google’s self-driving car 
assumes full control of the vehicle, and while, in 
principle, it might appear as if human decisions can 
always override the technologized driving process, 
there are no strict criteria which humans could apply 
in the context of such a process (because the 
decisions of the vehicle necessarily depend on the 
unpredictable circumstances that emerge in its 
environment); in fact, the self-driving car caused its 
first crash when the human user was not certain 
whether he should have intervened (Davies, 2016). In 
the news domain, Bloomberg now uses automated 
sentiment analysis to provide financial news about 
companies in an automated way; this can further 
assist its customers in making financial decisions, 
“without having to consume the content” 
(Bloomberg, 2015). In the job market, many of the 
world’s biggest companies use automated vetting 
software to screen résumés for particular job 
applications without even glancing at the résumés on 
the first round (Millar, 2012). Even in the judiciary, 
the discussion about whether computers would be 
better and fairer judges than humans has been around 
since 1977, and the algorithmic imposition of verdicts 
and fines has also been considered (D’Amato, 1977).  
The examples listed above serve to illustrate (briefly) 
a two-step transition: the reduction of human agency, 
and the conditioning of humans based on technology 
acquiring systemic characteristics. Such 
characteristics are emergent and not reducible to any 
causal backdrop. Humans may conceive of their 
intervention as either not desirable (e.g., not 
financially beneficial or not influential in a system 
that develops itself algorithmically), or uncertain 
(e.g., humans are not sure if they should intervene to 
disrupt technologized decision-making, as such 
disruption could entail its own severe consequences). 
Humans might also avoid taking alternative actions 
that could be more beneficial to them, as a beneficial 
alternative might be masked due to an excessive 
reliance of human decisions on institutionalized 
technological stimuli. No matter the example, we can 
observe the object (i.e. the unity) that is the 
distinction between humans/technology differently. 
By simulating human decision-making in machines 
(e.g., autonomous driving), humans create a similar 




human/technology interaction within the domain of 
technology but are then subjected to its outcome, for 
which there needs to be another interaction that 
remains contingent on the former. Technology is 
expected to behave, search, invest, analyze, and 
decide as humans would, but the invisibility of how 
this is conducted in more complex systems, creates a 
series of contingencies. Of course, to establish the 
deeper second-order dynamics of these examples (in 
the tradition of second-order cybernetics), it would 
be necessary to delve into each example as a 
distinct case and explore the general recursive 
nature of human/technology interactions. 
4 Theoretical Conditions for 
Considering Technology Itself as 
a System 
In exploring a set of requirements/principles that 
systems theorizing must satisfy, Demetis and Lee 
(2016) consider general principles that are based on 
the founders of systems theory like Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy (1969), Kenneth Boulding (1956), James 
Grier Miller (1978) and Anatol Rapoport (1950). In 
their work, Demetis & Lee extract three principles 
from this body of systems theory and add another 
three from Niklas Luhmann (1995); they maintain 
that systems theory is particularly relevant for IS 
research and a rich theory to draw from (regardless of 
any epistemological differences amongst different 
scholars). In this context, we argue that systems 
theory lends itself to exposing the subtle emergence 
of technologized interferences in the relationship 
between humans and technology and will enable 
researchers (due to its abstract/generalized lexicon) to 
render novel cases through its concepts across several 
domains of application. In Table 1 below, we list the 
six requirements as they appear in Demetis & Lee 
(2016). We give each one a code (Ri) for when we use 
the requirements in this paper though it is worth 
stressing that we don’t reflect on all six equally. Also, 
for the purposes of our discussion, we do not examine 
them in sequential order.  
.
Table 1: Systems Requirements by Demetis and Lee (2016) 
Requirement specified in Demetis and Lee (2016) Code 
Holism (the whole is more than the sum of the parts) R1 
Goal seeking R2 
Transformation process (of inputs into outputs) R3 
Self-reference and autopoiesis R4 
System/environment distinction R5 
Communication R6 
Our presentation of their requirements below is not a 
substitute for the original theoretical analysis—rather, 
it will be a discussion focused on targeting those 
theoretical conditions for thinking about a system 
comprised of technology. In other words, through 
different systems-theoretical principles, we can focus 
on the following question: What systems theoretical 
principles would need to be adhered to, in order to 
consider technology itself as a system?  
One of the first requirements that Demetis & Lee 
(2016) stipulate in R1 is the requirement to recognize 
that if we consider any system as a whole then “the 
whole is more than the sum of the parts.” Regardless 
of whether we take technological artifacts in one 
sense (e.g., a combination of hardware/software) or 
another (e.g., sociotechnical assemblages), this 
requirement still applies. Whenever any elements 
become interrelated and interdependent, they form a 
more complex system; however: “One cannot deduce 
from complexity alone which relations among 
elements are realized” (Luhmann, 1995). Applied to 
technology at large, this systemic requirement demands 
that whatever technological “whole” is identified by an 
observer needs to be considered as a system that 
exhibits emergent properties. These properties remain 
irreducible to the whole’s constituent elements.  
Another important requirement (R5) is based upon the 
fundamental distinction between system and 
environment. As stressed by Demetis & Lee (2016), 
this requirement is absolutely critical, as no system 
can be perceived without an environment (Luhmann, 
1995). The environment should not be perceived as 
some type of residual category. Instead, “relationship 
to the environment is constitutive in system 
formation” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 176). By considering 
this fundamental principle that constitutes a pillar of 
systems theory and transcends all systems theorists 
(Hammond, 2003), we can pose an important 





question: if we consider technology as a system then 
what is its environment? One response would be that 
humans (also labeled by Niklas Luhmann as psychic 
systems) are in the environment outside of and around 
a system of technology; another response would be 
other technologies that do not interconnect directly 
with a specified (by an observer) system of 
technology. Another option of course would be a 
combination of the above—an environment wherein 
both humans/technology reside. While all possibilities 
can be considered, when we describe technology as a 
system in itself, we make the case that—via the 
systemic evolution of technology and its deep 
penetration in society—technology as system 
assimilates more functions within itself; in doing so, 
humans are cast out to the environment around the 
system of technology and cease to perform the 
function of decision-making (or are very limited in 
doing so). On occasion, the function of humans in the 
environment outside a system of technology becomes 
increasingly restricted to merely providing inputs 
through which technologized decision-making can 
continue uninterrupted. In this regard, the system of 
technology is the nondeterministic system that 
emerges from the complex interactions of networked IT 
artifacts, and which remains loosely coupled with an 
environment of humans, with the latter largely occupying 
the role of human artifacts in this system. It is a system, in 
the systems theoretical sense, so it is not simply IT or an 
IT artifact per se. Thus, where we consider technology as 
system, we have high degrees of technologized decision-
making, weaker human/technology interactions, and 
stronger technology/technology interactions. As a whole, 
the behavior of the system of technology is 
irreducible to its constituent parts and thus linearity 
and causality do not apply.  
At this point, it would be helpful to the reader if we 
acknowledged a difference—an extension from how 
Luhmann perceived technology. As we speak of a 
system of technology, we need to make it clear that 
Luhmann’s depiction of technology was different and 
anchored on a set of a few principles that saw 
technology in a different light (it’s also useful here to 
note that the types of phenomena that we refer to in 
this paper did not exist and Luhmann had not 
experienced the Internet as we know it today). For 
Luhmann, technology could be thought of as a 
“functioning simplification in the medium of 
causality” (Luhmann, 1993, p. 87). In plainer terms, 
Luhmann is simply recognizing that we have a 
reduction of an initial complexity, a simplification, 
which is channeled into technology. By considering 
causality as a medium, Luhmann depicts technology 
as a conduit of causal relations; as an enabler that 
converts (and reduces) an initial complexity into 
causality. In the case of technology, Luhmann 
considers the medium of causality as a representation 
of strict “operational continuity” (Moeller, 2006, p. 
104). While we agree with Luhmann’s depiction of 
technology, we find it more applicable for 
technology-oriented systems that are generally self-
contained. But in a context of networked interactions 
(like in our example of algorithmic trading), we argue 
that causality is ultimately lost: causality dissipates at 
the level of the system (of technology) and 
controllability cannot be ensured. From this observing 
perspective, technological causality at the microlevel 
morphs into uncertainty at the macrolevel where it 
gives rise to emergent phenomena that cannot be 
attributed back to their original, and causal, 
representations (i.e., the whole of the behavior of IT 
artifacts is more than the sum of its parts). This leads 
to significant side effects. Reichel (2011, p. 106) 
frames this by saying that it is a convenient illusion, a 
beautiful lie to ensure the engineer, and in fact all 
human users of technology and their social 
communication about technology, that technology is 
manageable and the one last domain claiming 
predictability in our ever more contingent and 
insecure world” (Reichel, 2011, p. 106).  
Opening the door to such a depiction of technology, 
Luhmann himself admitted that “the specious security 
of technology, based on repeatability and the control 
of defects, is a delusive one. This has consequences 
for the concept of risk” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 225) and 
this is exactly why he tackled technology in tandem 
with risk in his book chapter on “The Special Case of 
High Technology” (Luhmann, 1993, p. 83). Thus, an 
initial complexity is cast into causality at the 
microlevel through technology, and in turn, causal 
interactions give rise to risk. In a sense, the paradox 
of technology is the emergence of uncertainty and 
risk from within a series of streamlined (and forced) 
causalities (Angell & Demetis, 2010). Ultimately, the 
output of that paradox under conditions of reduced 
human agency leads us to a radical rethink of the role 
of humans in the interplay between humans and 
technology: the indeterminist-oriented, technological 
construction of humans by technology. While humans 
both act on, and are acted upon by technology, the 
combinatory effects of the deep penetration of 
technology in society and the emergence of a systemic 
character for technology, leads to circumstances 
where the latter condition prevails. When exactly this 
happens in a domain (like finance) might be difficult 
to ascertain; however, it is first important to recognize 
that it is indeed occurring and to explore the 
theoretical consequences of such a condition.  
For humans, this is of course hard to accept and 
explore—in part, because it implies that humans 
simply react to what is now technologized decision-
making and that, by and large, human “decisions” are 
secondary to systems-made decisions. At the very 
least, humans and what they believe to be their own 
decision-making, need to adapt to the emergence of 




systemic technological phenomena. Is human behavior 
patterning itself after, or simply being patterned by 
what the system of technology generates?  
One implication leading from the primacy of the 
system/environment distinction is that the distinction 
can be replicated within the system (i.e., within any 
observed system, one can delineate further sub-
system/environment distinctions). This is another way 
of saying that the system replicates that primary 
distinction (between system/environment) within 
itself. This idea of any form (defined by Luhmann as 
the unity of a distinction) affecting itself recursively is 
distilled in the concept of re-entry. Influenced by 
Bateson (1972), Luhmann makes the following 
remarks: “Accordingly, the re-entry of the form 
into the form—or of the distinction into the 
distinction, or of the difference between system 
and environment into the system—should be 
understood as referring to the same thing twice. 
The distinction re-enters the distinguished. This 
constitutes re-entry.” (Luhmann, 2006, p. 54) 
This type of re-entry is tightly connected with the 
concept of self-reference (R4): satisfying the systemic 
requirement for self-reference means identifying 
processes through which a system collects 
information about itself (and its own functioning), 
where this in turn can contribute to a change in its 
functioning. Through self-referential processes, 
certain systems (those that Luhmann calls autopoietic, 
a term he borrows from Maturana [1980]) 
continuously reproduce and maintain themselves. In 
this regard, considering technology as a self-
referential system implies recognition of these 
dynamics that exhibit this form of re-entry; 
technology referring to technology is not a new 
phenomenon, but again, in the context of 
technologized decision-making, this acquires further 
significance. To the degree that technologized 
decisions become deeply embedded across different 
social systems, they elevate the complexity of the 
system of technology. This condition makes it harder 
for humans to gain visibility of the consequences of 
such systemic technologizing and, due to the 
excessive reliance of humans on technology, this 
reinforces the role reversal between the two. In a 
sense, the demand for further technologized decision-
making ends up with humans augmenting the 
systemic character of technology further.  
Another important systems requirement that follows 
Luhmann’s systems theory involves the requirement 
for communication (R6). For Luhmann, who reserves 
the term communication to indicate a broader 
mechanism (instead of only an act between human 
individuals), communication can be considered in the 
following triad form: announcement/utterance 
(Mitteilung), information (Information), and 
understanding (Verstehen). Also, in the event that 
human beings participate in the communication 
process, it would follow that the cognitive 
understanding (Verstehen) that would be developed by 
the recipient might not correspond to the intentionality 
of the individual conducting the utterance.  
The reciprocity in communication, however, demands 
that whatever entity is receiving information 
following another entity’s utterance will react based 
on its own (the former’s) understanding. While we 
are typically used to thinking about these processes as 
human-based exchanges, they can be easily applied at 
a more abstract level. In fact, one of the pioneering 
theoretical implications of Luhmann’s systems theory 
was the separation of the communication process 
from psychic systems (i.e., humans) and its 
consideration as a function of society (Luhmann, 
1995, 2012). Keeping in mind that Luhmann himself 
had not addressed the issue of how the triad 
mentioned above could look in the context of 
technology and recognizing that there can never be a 
one-to-one correspondence between such contexts, 
we offer some additional thoughts.  
In a system comprised of technology (rather than of 
humans), the hardest element of the triad to consider 
is understanding (Verstehen); however, that does not 
necessarily imply a cognitive understanding. In the 
case of a system of technology, substituting for 
human (or cognitive) understanding is what we label 
technologized understanding. Again, it is important to 
clarify that the concept of technologized 
understanding is not part of Luhmann’s description 
but we find it important to introduce it as we seek to 
describe how the system of technology interferes with 
the recursive construction of human (cognitive) 
understanding. In our description, technologized 
understanding signals the a priori acceptance or 
rejection of any information, which would then 
prompt a computational response (another utterance) 
on the basis of a precoded algorithmic rationality. 
This demarcates the transition from (human) 
reflective understanding to preorganized 
understanding (that effectively collapses—or is 
reduced to—computerized decision-making). To 
describe this, we are considering the interplay 
between system/environment (i.e., technology 
/humans) and consider human artifacts to be 
characterized by a unique form of a Verstehen of 
Verstehen (echoing Foerster’s 2002 book title 
“Understanding Understanding”). This demarcates a 
unique recursive conditioning of human, cognitive 
understanding that can be described as follows: (a) 
humans imbue with their Verstehen of a problem 
domain the modelling and the design of the 
conditions for algorithmic interactions that influence 
computerized understanding (this does not mean that 
computers “understand”; only that they render 
understanding in a computational frame). However, 





(b) the complexity of networked interactions amongst 
scores of IT artifacts within a domain, dissipates the 
causality intended; complexity of interactions leads to 
nondeterministic outputs and these lead to risk. This 
is because elements can interconnect only by facing a 
necessary reduction in their own intrinsic complexity 
(and thus in their own potentiality). Without this 
necessary reduction in the intrinsic complexity of 
elements, connections cannot be established between 
them (Luhmann, 1995). In a sense, the dissipation of 
causality is a precondition for computerized decision-
making to even exist and in turn, (c) the 
nondeterministic outputs that propagate from within 
the system of technology are disjoined from the 
intentions of human designers. Eventually, such 
outputs are (d) fed back into the environment where 
they reconstruct and reshape human verstehen. The 
very act of introducing technology, introduces a 
mechanism for computerized understanding, the 
output of which reconstitutes human Verstehen. The 
greater the reduction in human agency and the greater 
the complexity of interactions, the more masked the 
outputs and the stimuli that are spontaneously 
generated by technology. As we will see in our case, 
even in examples of—almost—catastrophic failure, it 
was not possible to attribute the problems to specific 
algorithms or traders, precisely because the whole 
(the system of technology) had become more than the 
sum of its limited parts (IT artifacts).  
Also, human decisions are not just transferred across 
to computer decisions via the design of specific 
artifacts. The input from human designers is 
transformed (R3) into system-technologized 
decisions/outputs through a complex nexus of 
technological interactions. While the goal-seeking 
(R2) of specific algorithms may be perceived as fixed 
at the microlevel, at the macrolevel of the system, it 
becomes dynamic and carries the seeds of 
uncertainty. The very existence of unpredictable 
phenomena that emerge from such technological 
interactions is a testament to the fact that the 
correspondence between inputs and outputs in this 
context is nonlinear. As technology becomes 
responsible for “major systemic changes within the 
global financial sector . . . and as algorithms become 
ever more autonomous . . . we need a kind of ethical 
framework for developing algorithms” (Van Lier, 
2016). Alas, even with a strict micromanagement of 
algorithmic developments, the very act of developing 
interconnections results in emergent unpredictability.  
5 Case of The Dow Jones Index 
First, let us clarify that it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to organize and/or deconstruct all the 
technologically oriented incidents behind the events 
of May 6, 2010 (what has become known as the 
“Flash Crash of 2:45”). Indeed, there remain several 
conflicting aspects on these events (Lhabitant & 
Gregoriou, 2015; Moosa, 2015; Sornette & Becke, 
2011; Van Lier, 2016; Zaydlin, 2010) so we will 
focus here only on a handful of critical aspects that 
illustrate how the demand for increasing 
computerization is framing the interactions between 
humans and machines. In this regard, we would also 
like to highlight that the complexity of this case has 
also been attributed to the multifaceted role of 
algorithmic traders who make it almost impossible 
to deconstruct the case; this is acknowledged in 
several reports (see below).  
The purpose of this section is to reflect on the case of 
the Flash Crash and connect some of its key aspects 
to a systems-based reconceptualization of technology 
based on the systemic principles put forward by 
Demetis & Lee (2016). This theoretical framing will 
allow us to consider the case of the Dow Jones index 
collapse as an example of technological domination—
an example where the system of technology 
locates human artifacts in its environment, outside 
of and around the technology. The key sources 
that we will use in order to review the main 
findings of the Flash Crash include: 
1. The report of the staffs of the U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
the Joint Advisory Committee on Emerging 
Regulatory Issues.  
2. The UK report on “Crashes and High 
Frequency Trading” from the Government 
Office for Science (The Future of Computer 
Trading in Financial Markets—Foresight 
Driver Review—DR 7), and 
3. An analysis for certified public accountants 
when advising investors entitled 
“Understanding the ‘Flash Crash’” that 
summarizes the basic characteristics of the 
Flash Crash in a succinct way (Betancourt, 
VanDenburgh, & Harmelink, 2011).  
First, in order to set the scene, it is important that we 
reflect on the turmoil behind the specific events in 
their broader context. Uncertainty in May 2010 was 
already widespread in the market due to the 
possibility of a Greek government default on 
sovereign debt (Marouli, Caloghirou, & Giannini, 
2015). Based on R5, we can think of this broader 
financial turmoil as the environmental stimulus to 
which the system of algorithmic traders would react. 
This negative market sentiment “was already 
affecting an increase in the price volatility of some 
individual securities” (CFTC/SEC, 2010, p. 1). This 
set in motion the following key events before the 2:45 
p.m. crash (in chronological order): 




1. A number of volatility pauses were triggered 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
around 1 p.m.; individual equities began to 
increase above average levels. 
2. The S&P 500 volatility index rose by 22.5% 
by 2:30 p.m. Due to conditions of such 
volatility, investors moved their capital away 
from investments that were considered to be 
high-risk and towards safer options while the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average was down by 
2.5% (due to selling pressure). 
3. Buy-side liquidity in the “E-Mini” and the 
“SPY” (the E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts 
and the S&P 500 SPDR exchange traded fund) 
suffered 55% and 20% declines respectively. 
4. Then, more critically, at about 2:32 p.m., a 
large fundamental trader (a mutual fund 
complex) “initiated a sell program to sell a total of 
75,000 E-mini contracts (valued at approximately 
$4.1 billion) as a hedge to an existing equity 
position” (CFTC/SEC, 2010, p. 2). 
The last step in the event is viewed as one of the 
critical triggers that led to the Flash Crash. But before 
we develop that further, we need to make an 
important observation in this context. Whereas traders 
can choose how much human judgment is involved 
when executing a trade (e.g., the trader can choose to 
enter orders manually in different time intervals, or 
indeed, outsource the process to a third party that will 
manage this process by conducting block-trades), 
over the years, the interference of human judgment 
came to be perceived (by humans themselves) as an 
obstacle. For example, Lewis (2014) remarks that 
during the crash of 1987 when the U.S. stock market 
fell sharply by 22.61%, 
some Wall Street brokers, to avoid the 
orders their customers wanted to place to 
sell stocks, simply declined to pick up their 
phones . . . this time the authorities 
responded by changing the rules—making 
it easier for computers to do the jobs done 
by those imperfect people. The 1987 stock 
market crash set in motion a process—
weak at first, stronger over the years—that 
has ended with computers entirely 
replacing the people. (Lewis, 2014, p. 3)  
The need for computerized decision-making was 
paired with the inexorable need for speed; the 
intensification of these dynamics led to Wall Street’s 
“speed war.” An example of that was the 
development of a superfast fiber-cable route between 
Chicago and New York by Daniel Spivey, just to 
shave “3 milliseconds off of the previous route of 
lowest latency” (Steiner, 2010). Speed matters; the 
fastest algorithm can exploit a large volume of minor 
discrepancies between markets and this is tantamount 
to “picking gold coins from the floor” (Steiner, 2010).  
In such a context, where 825 miles of fiber are laid 
down through mountains, tunnels, and rivers, in the 
straightest line possible in order to shave off 3 
milliseconds of trading, one can begin to contemplate 
how human beings are perceived (by the designers of 
algorithmic trading systems), considering the average 
reaction time (for the click of a button) is 215 
milliseconds. Human beings are not just slow—they 
are (almost) redundant in such a market (though—as 
we shall see—they still serve the purpose of 
recalibrating (parts of) the technological system that 
is actually making the decisions). More recently, the 
search for more speed that would allow even faster 
versions of algorithmic trading to take place has led 
to large investments in microwave 
communications—with the goal of shaving off one 
extra millisecond in transacting (Westbrook, 2014). 
It was in this context that a large fundamental trader 
initiated a sell program for the $4.1 billion trade; this 
was executed automatically, and thus an algorithm 
was tasked to sell $4.1 billion. In this case, the trader 
“chose to execute this sell program via a . . .‘Sell 
Algorithm’ that was programmed to feed orders . . . 
but without regard to price or time” (CFTC/SEC, 
2010, pp. 2–3). The algorithm only took volume into 
consideration. But while the initial problems were 
indeed created by the algorithm of the fundamental 
trader, they were then “amplified by the strategic 
behavior of HFT [high-frequency trading]” (Sornette 
& Becke, 2011, p. 11). HFT is yet another name for 
algorithmic trading or black-box trading. The 
consequences of the amplification of the Sell 
Algorithm by yet other algorithms created a dynamic 
exchange between technologies of the same type. 
Based on R3 this can be framed in the following 
general form: Technology A provides a stimulus for 
exciting technology B, and the output of B’s 
operation(s), as feedback and input to A, recursively 
shape the environment of technological subsystem A.  
One can conceptualize this situation through systems 
theorizing by means of considering alternative 
observing perspectives with which to explore the 
system/environment distinction (R5). First, if the Sell 
Algorithm executed by the large fundamental trader is 
considered from the perspective of technological 
subsystem A, then in its environment one can 
observe: (a) the totality of all other automated 
execution algorithms (let’s call those Algo(1), 
Algo(2), . . . Algo(n)), and (b) the transaction 
outcomes from human traders (though as we saw in 
the introduction, the volume of their transactions is 
becoming more and more limited). Similarly, if we 
take the different observing perspective of another 
HFT, say Algo(2), which we define as our system, we 
would observe the Sell Algorithm in its environment, 





along with all other automated execution 
algorithms—Algo(1), Algo(3), . . . Algo(n)—as well 
as the human traders. Naturally, for fair competition 
reasons, the trading logic of any given Algo(n) is 
hidden from all other algorithms. Considering 
both of the mentioned observing perspectives in 
tandem at a metalevel (one that would be 
applicable for any automated execution), we have 
a system that is stimulated by the reactions it itself 
triggers upon its own environment.  
Indeed, while the sell pressure established by the Sell 
Algorithm was initially absorbed by high-frequency 
traders (HFTs), at about 2:44 p.m., HFTs started to 
sell contracts aggressively. Then, the Sell Algorithm 
used by the large trader responded to the increased 
volume “by increasing the rate at which it was 
feeding the orders into the market, even though orders 
that it already sent to the market were arguably not 
yet fully absorbed” (CFTC/SEC, 2010, p. 3). This 
type of self-reference (R4) can be portrayed as a 
“negative spiraling effect . . . (where) . . . HFT may have 
a destabilizing effect through its endogenous self-
excitation nature within the (small) pool of participants” 
(Sornette & Becke, 2011, p. 11). This unsupervised self-
excitation of technology at the level of the financial 
market is based upon a coupling between technology 
and technology, a condition that relegates humans to the 
external environment of that system. This has both 
significant and specific implications.  
In the events that unfolded, the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average plunged 998.5 points. This became known as 
the Flash Crash of 2:45 (and while the index 
recovered some moments later, it wiped out value 
from several companies). After five months of 
investigations, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), along with the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), attributed the 
decline to the automated execution of orders despite 
the fact that no specific reason/trigger/algorithm 
could be identified for the event. In fact,  
the exact reason or reasons for the so-
called Flash Crash remain obscured by the 
mechanics of the electronic trading 
systems that execute millions of buy-and-
sell orders during the course of a single 
trading day. Some initially blamed the 
crash on a “fat finger,” (meaning a big 
individual investor) while others contended 
that essentially unregulated electronic 
trading platforms were the culprit. Others 
even questioned whether terrorists or 
hackers were behind the dramatic drop 
(Betancourt et al., 2011, pp. 40–41). 
The difficulty in identifying a specific cause renders 
the very idea of cause and effect (itself a nonsystemic 
idea) problematic in this context; this constitutes an 
irony, considering that the repeatable operations of 
technology usually allow the identification/back-
tracking of effects. Of course, without recursive 
feedback, technology as a system would not exhibit 
such ramifications in the first place. In this regard, 
what would otherwise be conceptualized as cause and 
effect is better conceptualized as a web of back-and-
forth impacts distributed amongst the complex 
interactions within the broader system of technology. 
There is no “error” in the individual technologies 
themselves (i.e., the algorithms); no bug that needs to be 
rectified. Thus, nonattribution of error to a single 
algorithm leads us to consider this as a systemic 
phenomenon that emerges out of the complex interaction 
of multiple automated execution technologies (R1).  
Of course, the Flash Crash would have been 
impossible at such a level without the complex 
interactions between algorithms. As the testimony of 
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro confirmed to the U.S. 
Congress: “automated trading systems will follow 
their coded logic regardless of outcome, while human 
involvement likely would have prevented these orders 
from executing at absurd prices” (Schapiro, 2010, p. 
7). The unpredictability with which automated 
algorithms feed off each other creates emergent 
conditions that can destabilize any system that 
technology itself penetrates. For the financial system 
that serves such an important function within the 
broader system of society, the implications are clear: 
Market outcomes are guided by computerized 
decisions that are executed algorithmically. While 
individual algorithms may reflect the general 
intentions of their designers, the algorithms as a 
whole find themselves within a far more complex 
environment (that they themselves help to constitute 
and recreate). In such conditions, algorithms feed off 
each other and—within the demands for millisecond 
transacting and communication (R6)—create another 
version of the financial system where transacting 
decisions are executed in a technologized fashion; 
these lead to unpredictable consequences. Ultimately, 
this rearranges the roles of technology and humans.  
For example, the chaotic behavior of the Flash Crash, 
triggered another algorithm, known as the Stop Logic 
Functionality of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME). This was automatically executed in order to 
prevent any further price movements over an 
excessive range. By effectively pausing the market 
momentarily, this gives time to humans to recalibrate 
any parameters and relaunch the algorithms in the pit 
of algorithmic trading. The need to include stop-and- 
pause algorithms in order to contain any emergent 
uncertainties from the automated behavior of other 
buy/sell algorithms illustrates two things: first, how 
the “controllability” of technology is dependent on 
more technology, and, second, how restricted the role 
of human beings has become in the actual decision-




making processes in the financial system. To a large 
degree, “People no longer are responsible for what 
happens in the market, because computers make all 
the decisions” (Lewis, 2014, p. 270). Whatever 
intentionality is imbued within specific algorithms by 
its designers, this dissipates quickly within a sea of 
complexity. Humans are merely there to “recalibrate” 
the relaunch of algorithms so that the latter can be pitted 
against each other in millions of millisecond 
transactions, the net result of which is both unpredictable 
and an emergent stimulus for further transacting.  
Of course, once the demand for algorithmic decisions 
is firmly set, further complications can be considered. 
For example, new “crash algorithms will likely be 
developed to trade during periods of market stresses 
in order to profit from these periods” (Sornette & 
Becke, 2011, p. 4). Algorithms will also be developed 
that will attempt to exploit to the maximum the 
number of times they can offer/request something 
from the market. The patterns of some of these 
algorithms have been discovered on a few occasions, 
and what is rather astonishing is the speed with which 
orders can be placed. Below is a visualization of an 
algorithm (labeled the “Knife” by the company 
Nanex) where the algorithm transacts around 7 times 
every 60 milliseconds; in the image below, the dotted 
vertical lines indicate the 60ms intervals while the 
whole duration represented in the image below is 1.6 
seconds (red: ask price, dark red: best ask, light 
green: bid, dark green: best bid). The analysis of the 
company on high-frequency trading found “cases 
where one exchange was sending an extremely high 
number of quotes for one stock in a single second: as 
high as 5,000 quotes in 1 second!” That’s five quotes 
(for the same stock) every millisecond. As the 
company states: “Even more disturbing, there doesn’t 
seem to be any economic justification for this” 
(Nanex, 2010). This level of logical detachment of 
computerized decision-making from the 
corresponding domain-specific decisions that humans 
would make becomes amplified in a system of 
technology; through the system of technology, the 
relationship between humans and technology is 
shaped asymmetrically, with the intensity of the 










Figure 1. Visualization of Algorithmic Formations During Trading (with kind permission from nanex.net) 
Also, one could consider here algorithms that are 
designed to find the digital footprints of each other. 
By considering such algorithms that collaborate in 
specific market conditions, we could see the 
emergence of unfair algorithmic competition; and 
indeed, with the increasing attention that has been 
given to information security and cybersecurity 
breaches (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000), automated 
financial trading may become subject to hackers or 
terrorists that will seek to create financial instability 
deliberately (e.g., by deactivating/modifying a stop 
algorithm). Whatever the destabilization effect, the 
speed of such transacting and the practical alienation 
of the human factor—relegated to the environment of 
the system of technology—can lead to an algorithmic 
war (similar to Amazon’s algorithmic price 
escalations). To summarize, this involves algorithms 
that structure the market (by automated execution), 
antisystemic algorithms that could destabilize the 
system (e.g., by creating complexity in automated 
transacting and generating a financial crisis or other 
destabilization phenomena), crash algorithms that 
may exploit financial instability for profit, as well 
as the algorithmic response of the regulators to the 
crisis (through stop/pause algorithms). Due to the 
intrinsic complexity and the multiple entities 
involved in these cases, no single entity (human or 
algorithm) can monitor all financial interactions 
taking place at any given point in time. However, 
the ensemble of influences examined above 
highlight the necessary conditions for a system that 
maintains and sustains itself via the function of 
automation: the system of technology.  
With our case in mind, humans are now cast out to the 
environment of such a system with restricted 
functions and reduced agency. This does not mean 
that humans are made redundant from our theorizing: 
only that the relationship between humans and 
technology needs to be reoriented and the intensity of 
this relationship considered in terms of both its 
consequences and its directionality. It is in this 
context, and inspired by Simon’s (1996) indicia for 
artifacts, that we can now posit the following 
rudimentary principles for the human artifact. In each 
principle, we offer the systems theoretical context in 
which their interpretation can be supported. 
Consistent with the Popperian tradition that accepts 
paradoxes as unavoidable in any form of knowledge 
construction, we claim neither universality nor 
absolute truth in these principles. Under the 
conditions of a system of technology, we do hope that 
they are useful in reconceptualizing the role of 
humans within the distinction between 
humans/technology. It is also important to clarify that 
it is still humans that fill the role of human artifact in 
that it is a role that humans assimilate themselves 
into. This becomes activated in a spectrum of 
technologized decision-making, whereby human 
agency is greatly reduced (and humans become sidelined 
in their decision-making by offering mostly reactionary 
feedback that supports the uninterrupted operations of 
technology). We prompt other scholars to explore 
alternatives, reflect on their systems theoretical context, 
explore different systems approaches that could highlight 
other important aspects (e.g., complexity theory, boundary 
critique, system dynamics) and find new application 
contexts within which they can be enriched. 





Table 2: Principles for The Human Artifact and Systemic Considerations 
Principles for the human artifact Systems theoretical context and implication 
P1: Humans become artifacts shaped by the 
unintended consequences of complex 
interactions of IT artifacts (role 
reversal). 
Human artifacts are in the environment surrounding a system of technology 
that emerges from the multiplicity of the complex interactions of IT 
artifacts. Humans as human artifacts continue to be loosely coupled with 
and affect the system of technology that emerges from such interactions. 
However, the combination of emergent stimuli from the system of 
technology and the excessive dependency of humanity on technology 
carves new boundaries for both technological and human agency. With no 
control over such a boundary, this could be labeled as “emergent 
indeterminism.” In that space, human/technology interactions become 
weaker and technology/technology interactions become stronger; outcomes 
develop through high degrees of computerized decision-making.  
P2: Human artifacts may imitate 
appearances of (natural) humans in 
the context of human decision-
making, while lacking, in one or 
many respects, the reality of the latter 
(reduced human agency).  
Human artifacts experience a shift in human decision-making. Reduction in 
human agency is a consequence of what occurs when interactions between 
IT artifacts become more than the sum of their parts and form complex 
networks within domains of society (e.g., the economy). Emergent 
phenomena, uncertainty and risk, become the background against which 
human decision-making is shaped. In the role of human artifacts, humans 
maintain a computationally contingent variant of human agency, with 
technology exercising a higher degree of non-causal influences on the 
boundary between the system of technology and its environment. It is the 
system of technology that influences human agency as it is irreducible to 
the lower-level properties and design of IT artifacts.  
P3: Human artifacts are characterized in 
terms of functions and goals that are 
both limited in human agency and 
largely confined to support the 
uninterrupted operations of a system of 
technology (heightened dependency of 
humans on technology).  
In contexts where technology is beginning to take over decision-making 
(e.g., algorithmic trading), the system of technology dominates the 
interaction between system/environment; human artifacts face an 
increasingly limited variety of decision-making that is both contingent and 
recursively shaped by the emergent phenomena and stimuli generated by 
the system of technology. The functions, goals, and adaptation of human 
artifacts are influenced by these systemic dynamics.  
P4: Human artifacts can be understood as 
technology shaped and their roles are 
discussed and designed as responses to 
technologized imperatives (technology- 
shaped agency).  
The system of technology shapes what human artifacts must perform and 
act on with a reduced human agency in order to secure the uninterrupted 
operations of technologized decision-making.  
 
By introducing the above indicia, we hope that the 
difference between the human artifact and the IT 
artifact will create a meaningful distinction through 
which the IS community can engage with those new 
phenomena that are characterized by a reorientation 
of human/computer interactions, a reduction in 
human agency, and the emergence of a system of 
technology. As the role of the human artifact is a 
consequence of the role reversal that we describe in 
our paper, we find it important to clarify the spectrum 
in which we see its applicability. Indeed, we do not 
claim that it would be equally applicable to all 
technologies. In order to describe this, we introduce 
the illustration below (Figure 2) and describe it in 
brief. We emphasize that this should be viewed as a 
visual-conceptual aid and not as a mathematical 
representation of thresholds or placements of different 
IS in the area of human-technological agency. 






Figure 2. A Visual Metaphor for The Human Artifact In The Space Of Human/Technology Agency 
At the x-axis where technological agency is 
expressed, we have the transition from low to high 
degrees of technologized decision-making while at 
the same time, we express this transition as part of the 
much broader trajectory that we describe: the 
emergence of a system of technology as we move to 
the right of the x-axis. In a similar manner, on the y-
axis we have the spectrum of human agency. In cases 
where we have low degrees of technologized 
decision-making and high degrees of human agency, 
we find stronger human/technology interactions and 
weaker technology/technology interactions. The 
combined effect of a gradual reduction of human 
agency (lower part of y-axis) and the emergence of a 
system of technology (right part of x-axis) leads to a 
point (the role reversal) where technological agency 
becomes more significant and the role of the human 
artifact becomes dominant (with the shaded area in 
Figure 2 representing the area where the role of the 
human artifact applies within the human-technology 
agency space). In considering how different 
information systems would fit into that space, we 
have placed—indicatively—standalone software, 
ERP, algorithmic trading systems, and artificial 
intelligence, with the latter two placed in the area of 
where the human artifact would be prevalent. Also, in 
considering the two extreme scenarios of 
human/technology agency (low-low, high-high), we 
have transaction processing systems on one end (low 
human agency and low technological agency) while 
we have a more “futuristic” scenario on the other end 
of the spectrum (high human agency and high 
technological agency). Thus, in the space where both 
human and technological agency exhibit high degrees 
of decision-making, we find human/technology 
agencies converging—with one potential being 
humans augmented with AI and the development of a 
symbiotic agency (i.e., a hybrid agency). Of course, 
we recognize that organizations could place additional 
conditions onto human/technology agency expressions, 
thereby developing contingencies and moving IS into 
the human/technology agency space. Such conditions 
might be imposed by the structure of the organization, 
the mix of different technologies that are appropriated, 
the network of interactions, and so on.  
The concept of the human artifact can also be 
anchored in existing scholarly work and explored in 
that context. As an example, we illustrate in brief, 
where the construct of the human artifact would fit 




with previous work by Lee et al. (2015) who describe 
the “IS artifact” as a system with three subsystems: (1) 
a technology artifact, (2) an information artifact, and 
(3) a social artifact. In their work, the authors argue 
that when these artifacts “are brought together and 
interact, they can come to form what we call an IS 
artifact” (p. 9). Thus, an IS artifact can be portrayed 
as the system that emerges from the interactions 
amongst its subsystems. In our paper, we are taking 
an observing perspective within the (metalevel) 
system of the IS artifact proposed by Lee et al. and 
thus, in our case, the human artifact would be a sub-
subsystem of the social artifact, where the social 
artifact is a subsystem of the IS artifact system. Other 
sub-subsystems within the social artifact would 
include culture and social structure, with human 
beings occupying a double role in the social structure, 
one of human agency and another of human artifact.  
The introduction of the role of human artifacts also 
has implications for humans as it signifies changes 
and unpredictability that cannot be harnessed by 
redesigning technological artifacts or reconfiguring 
specific algorithms (due to the irreducibility principle 
in the context of R1). Humans are also greatly 
affected when they seek to interact within such 
domains. For example, an individual investor that is 
selecting a pension scheme may be unaware of the 
algorithmic trading strategies that would affect his 
own financial position, but ultimately she/he may be 
brought into the social artifact of the broader IS 
artifact that binds together technology, social, and 
information artifacts based on Lee et al.’s (2015) 
description. However, it is important to emphasize 
that this reconfiguration is not characterized by 
determinism. There is no regulation of this process as 
it is emergent. Outcomes are controlled neither by 
technology nor humans—they are the result of both 
strict and loose structural couplings across multiple 
dimensionalities of human/computer interactions that 
are in turn informed by other human/computer 
interactions: in other words, they are systemic. While 
we would be hesitant to label our position just yet, we 
could call it “emergent indeterminism” to 
differentiate it from both soft and hard determinism.  
While we do describe a reduced role for human 
beings via the emergence of a system of technology 
(from the multiplicity of complex interactions of 
technology artifacts) and the emergence of the role of 
human artifacts, we actually stand against such an 
outcome. In calling attention to this role reversal, we 
are warning against it. Our concern is not only that 
“the specious security of technology, based on 
repeatability and the control of defects, is a delusive 
one” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 225), but that the role of 
human artifacts and the excessive reliance of society 
on technology, will create less controllable risks over 
time. The ensemble of these contingencies will 
circumvent human decision-making.  
With these principles in mind, new technologies are 
designed as a reaction to how designers perceive the 
system of technology and wherever possible, 
designers code human decisions out of existence, 
thereby decreasing the actual involvement of human 
decision-making and accelerating the role reversal. 
These dynamics cannot be characterized by any form 
of determinism, as we’ve seen in our case. Whatever 
logic, controllability, and causality are injected into 
the technological domain, they dissipate quickly and 
are replaced by both uncertainty and unintended 
consequences. Technology has become systemic.  
6 Discussion: From Artifact to 
System 
As algorithmic domination in certain fields is 
changing the boundary between system/environment, 
between technology and humans, we feel there is a far 
greater role for the IS community to both pursue the 
consequences of these transitions and explore their 
implications within different organizational, societal, 
economic, and other contexts. Furthermore, with 
artificial intelligence on the rise, AI-based 
technologized decision-making is en route to 
reinforcing the systemic character of technology. 
Such transitions will require new theoretical 
constructs that should be able to open new horizons 
within the boundary between humans and technology; 
by introducing the construct of the human artifact, we 
hope to open up one such perspective in the context 
of a system of technology. By grounding this concept 
and the conditions that fuel it within systems theory, 
we hope we are contributing one part of the multiple 
contingent distinctions that will come into focus.  
By conceptualizing technology as a system—with the 
help of systems theory—we must clarify that we view 
the optimization of any algorithms as a series of 
microefforts that will have marginal, noncausal 
effects in the behavior of the emergent system of 
technology. The phenomena that occur at the level of 
the system of technology cannot be reverse-
engineered and attributed to specific starting points of 
algorithmic interference. Ultimately, through our case 
(the collapse of the Dow Jones index due to 
algorithmic trading) and our theoretical analysis, we 
offer a strong warning that there can be no 
controllability when an ensemble of IT artifacts 
acquires characteristics that are exhibited by emergent 
systems. Furthermore, this emergent system of 
technology has the capacity to highjack the function 
of important subsystems of society (like the economic 
system). Left uninterrupted, like in our example of 
algorithmic trading, technological operations may 
secure the continuous functioning of a subsystem of 




society (e.g., the economy) but this comes at a 
significant cost and with very high risks. This is also 
coupled by human decision-making becoming both 
marginalized and shaped by the nondeterministic 
effects of a system of technology. Thus, the 
emergence of unintended consequences and the 
unobservable complexities hidden behind algorithmic 
representations propel technology to a higher 
systemic level. Under specific circumstances (like 
those described in our case), human beings are 
restricted in the management of unintended 
consequences, an example of which is the 
intervention strategies chosen to relaunch the 
algorithms, the recalibration of trading thresholds 
based on human decision-making, the (human) design 
of new trading algorithms that will become part of the 
same nexus, general management decisions taken by 
humans and so on. While human beings, cast into 
the environment, can never be taken “out of the 
equation” as they are constitutive of the system of 
technology (as environments are always constitutive 
of the systems, based on R5), they do become more 
loosely coupled with the IT artifacts, as routine 
decision-making shifts from humans to technology 
and human agency is reduced.  
Despite our use of the Flash Crash incident, we are 
not making a value judgment about whether 
algorithmic trading is good or bad from an economic 
perspective. Indeed, there are scholars arguing that—
overall—high-frequency trading by algorithms may 
even be beneficial for market liquidity (Anderson, 
Binner, Hagströmer, & Nilsson, 2015; Cliff & 
Northrop, 2012; Johnston, 2015). However, we would 
like to draw the attention of our readers to the 
fundamental imbalance in human/computer decision-
making and highlight the interest that this poses for 
the field of IS. At a minimum, the conditions 
described above should allow us to reflect further on 
the transition from IT as an artifact (a tool shaped and 
used by humans to serve human ends) to IT as its own 
system (which, in turn, could regard humans as tools 
that maintain the systemic nature of technology). In 
that condition, technology gives rise to emergent 
phenomena and cannot be controlled in a causal way. 
Of course, this runs contrary to the design of 
technologies with a specified coded rationality.  
The logic with which any given technological artifact 
interacts with other technological artifacts also 
requires reconsideration. In circumstances like those 
we have described in the previous section for the 
Flash Crash, one cannot deny that there is a high 
degree of complexity (not even a prolonged 
investigation could identify the “causes” as these are 
distributed and not linked to single entities). But there 
is another reading of complexity that could illuminate 
an additional aspect (we alluded to this in a previous 
section). Luhmann defines complexity  
as a measure of the incapacity of a system 
to relate each element to every other one, 
be it in the system itself (system 
complexity) or in its environment 
(environmental complexity). . . .Complexity 
means the necessity of selective relations 
and, since relations specify what elements 
are possible within the system, complexity 
also means contingent elements. The 
analysis of complexity leads back to the 
notion of self-referential, self-organizing 
systems. (Luhmann, 1983, p. 993). 
Applied to the conditions that this view of complexity 
poses for technological interconnections, we can infer 
the following: different technological artifacts must 
succumb to a restriction of their individual coded 
rationalities as a precondition to interconnect. This 
serves to illustrate how the specificity of individual 
coded rationalities within any given IT artifact cannot 
be expressed due to the unavoidable restrictions 
imposed during interconnections. A very simple 
example of this is the following (this does not 
however capture the technologized complexity of 
more complex networks or entire function systems of 
society like the economic system): Suppose we have 
two different companies (A and B) that engage in 
algorithmic trading and both companies are the only 
two companies that want to sell/buy stock to/from 
another company X. We assume that A will not know 
what B’s strategy would be and vice versa. By 
participating in algorithmic trading, A wants to sell 
the stock of company X and has set an algorithmic 
parameter between $20 and $10 (we’re making the 
hypothesis here that price is the only criterion). 
Company B on the other hand has set an algorithmic 
parameter to buy the stock between $6 and $12. Both 
algorithms are executed so that their strategies are 
optimized (so the algorithm would first start 
exploring the sale of the stock at $20 before going 
down to $19.5, $19, and so on—one can inject here 
several other conditions like the time-frequency with 
which the drop would take place, the value of the 
drop in each step (say $0.10, $0.50, $1), etc). 
Similarly for B (starting from $6). But before even 
this process starts to take place for A and B, the 
subset of precoded rationalities, specifically the 
subset within the range between $12–$20 for A and 
$6–$10 for B, constitutes a nonexistent set for an 
observer who would have visibility of both. The 
establishment of allowed relations between A and B 
as a prerequisite for interconnecting, necessitates a 
restriction from the full spectrum of available 
possibilities for each one. Even in this simple 
example, seemingly well-defined thresholds that 
express precoded rationalities are facing restrictions 
based on their environment. The extent of 
unavoidable restrictions in element interconnection 
cannot be anticipated by the designers of the original 




systems of A and B. Despite the strict controls that 
may be imposed by designers, the very act of 
interconnection and communication, implies limitation.  
Then, if we consider more realistic assumptions like: 
(a) dynamic ranges in price (say between $x and $y), 
which will not be fixed, or (b) algorithms that take 
input from their (uncertain and dynamic) 
environments in order to “determine” that (temporary 
$x–$y) range, we can see how millions of 
transactions and millisecond timeframes fuel systemic 
complexity. What is the role of designers in this case? 
What meaning does “controllability” acquire in the 
context of an “artifact?” Hence, the design of any 
technological artifact (such as an algorithm) with a 
specific coded rationality is simply the starting point 
through which that artifact will be allowed to partake 
in the complex nexus of algorithmic exchanges. 
Through those, all technologized trading algorithms 
“design” the market collectively and create an 
asymmetry between humans/technology; in those 
domains where technology has become more 
dominant in overtaking human decision-making, this 
implies a severe restriction of human agency, 
intentionality, participation, and decision-making. 
Consequently, the emergence of a system of 
technology is coupled with a decline in human agency 
and a rise of artificial humans (human artifacts).  
This shift that we describe not only implies that 
“technologies create the ways in which people 
perceive reality” (Postman, 1993, p. 21); in taking 
decision-making away from humans, technologized 
decision-making within the context of a system of 
technology creates a reality that actually casts humans 
out to its environment. As such, human decision-
making is becoming more and more restricted to a 
support/“tool-like” role that allows for the 
continuation of complex and invisible (at the level of the 
system) technologized decision-making. In mutating 
from an artifact (at the microlevel) to a system (at the 
macrolevel), technology carves new boundaries in the 
distinction between humans and technology. This 
presents new challenges but also opens up an important 
and novel domain for IS research.  
7 A Research Agenda for The 
Future 
Given the challenges that are presented in the context 
we describe, a number of additional questions can be 
raised. For the IS field that will find itself in a far 
more complex (and rapidly developing) space, where the 
reconfiguration between technology and humans will be 
anchored in a realignment between computerized 
decision-making and human decision-making, a series of 
questions will demand further exploration.  
First, how can posthumanist approaches in IS 
research be adopted and encouraged? Given that there 
is a spectrum of interactions between humans and 
technology, how will management processes and the 
management of information systems be affected by 
the emergent system of technology? In exploring the 
new challenges that are posed by technologized 
decision-making in the context of the role reversal 
that we describe, we prompt IS scholars to look 
actively for cases that exhibit high degrees of 
technologized decision-making and to study the 
consequences these have for humans/human artifacts, 
organizations, and society at large within specific 
domains. These can come from different domains 
(e.g., e-commerce, law, finance, politics, science) and 
indeed, explorations from different domains would 
yield complementary insights about how 
technologized decision-making occupies the space of 
human/technology agency. Also, even though we do 
see emerging technologies (e.g., algorithmic trading, 
machine learning, artificial intelligence) as having a 
clearer influence in the role reversal that we describe, 
we also see the need for exploring the dynamics of 
the underlying digital infrastructures and networks in 
terms of how they support, develop, or restrict 
technologized decision-making. While we see the 
potential for many different approaches and applied 
research designs, given the nature of the phenomena at 
play, in-depth case studies would help create interesting 
insights into the conditions that prevail in the spectrum 
where the role of the human artifact applies.  
Consistent with the concept of the IS artifact by Lee et 
al. (2015) and referring back to Figure 2, a series of 
further questions are important for further exploration:  
a. How would different IT artifacts fit into the 
human/technology agency spectrum?  
b. How would different IS artifacts recreate the 
human/technology agency spectrum and how 
would different organizational contexts affect 
the dynamics of the relationships described?  
c. How can we enhance our understanding about 
what constitutes a stronger/weaker 
human/technology interaction and why?  
d. What forms/types/classifications of 
technological agency can we delineate? What 
is their organizational and social 
impact/significance?  
e. What other systems theoretical approaches 
could yield insights into these phenomena? 
While we use some key systems theoretical 
principles in this paper to discuss the 
emergence of a system of technology, we do 
think other systems theoretical analyses would 
lead to interesting paths of exploration (e.g., 
system dynamics, complexity theory). The 
very transition from artifact to system requires 
a rethinking of the systemic role of technology 




in society, and we see second-order 
cybernetics as opening many interesting paths 
of exploration in this regard, with an obvious 
one being the emergence of systemic risks 
from technology and pursuing a systemic 
description of the dynamics discussed above 
through elements and their relations 
(Luhmann, 1995).  
f. We warn, however, that fixing ontological 
clarity for the concept of the human artifact 
would be as difficult as it is for the IT artifact. 
Exhaustive scholarly debate on the singularity 
of the concept of the human artifact would be 
counterproductive because we offer this 
concept in a particular light and context, 
prompting others to focus on what the 
distinction between the IT artifact/human 
artifact implies, since identity is only possible 
in comparison to difference (Bateson, 1972). 
By focusing on the differences of concepts as a 
unit of analysis instead of the concepts in 
isolation, a systems-theoretical discussion 
would further enable explorations into the 
contextual significance of the difference 
between the IT artifact and human artifact.  
Of course, broader IS issues are important in the 
space that we describe. The ethics of IS are also 
important as phenomena, which, like the current 
pervasiveness of misinformation and fake news, will 
gradually become far more alarming and 
sophisticated, with the generation and communication 
of realistic content becoming entirely fictionate (e.g., 
AI-tools generating fake content and social bots 
spreading it). Our world is increasingly governed by 
technological systems that have deep effects in 
society; thus, understanding how power is delegated 
to such technological systems is critical (Jasanoff, 
2016). It is essential that we understand the 
relationships between IS design in complex systems 
and early warning signs (where possible) that would 
assist the interventions of human agency when 
necessary. But where lies responsibility for complex 
IS failures when the systemic character of technology 
does not allow us to pinpoint exactly what/who is 
responsible? Can we develop approaches where 
human responsibility is connected to algorithmic 
responsibility, and how can the latter be dissected and 
even connected to designers? In other words, how can 
the new system of technology be governed and what 
is the role of IS design in that context?  
As technologized decision-making continues to 
change the landscape of human/technological agency, 
the systemic character of technology elevates the 
need to address the fundamental shifts that we 
describe in this paper. The consequences of the role 
reversal between humans and IT create new 
challenges but also open new and exciting 
possibilities for research.   
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